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S
ocial Security—and the solvency of its Trust Fund—have increas-
ingly become a focus of discussion in the media and policy circles.
In President Bush’s 2005 State of the Union address, for example,
more than a fifth of the address dealt with Social Security. The basic
problem is that promised benefits will soon exceed program revenues.
Without changes in benefits or funding, the Trustees of Social Security
project that assets in the Trust Fund will be depleted in 2041. 
While Social Security is a serious problem for taxpayers and benefi-
ciaries, Medicare poses an even greater challenge. Indeed, with
healthcare costs rising much faster than the growth in the economy,
Medicare spending is also on an unsustainable path. Together, the two
programs’ benefits currently amount to about 6 percent of GDP. By
2080 they are projected to swell to 20 percent.
With spending on these two programs projected to grow faster than
the nation’s GDP, the Board of Trustees of Social Security and Medicare
have concluded that “We do not believe the currently projected long-
run growth rates of Social Security and Medicare are sustainable under
current financing arrangements.” To keep the programs solvent without
slashing benefits or increasing tax revenues, the federal budget deficit
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7must grow drastically. Thus, finding permanent solutions to these prob-
lems is critical, and the problems only become larger the longer reforms
are delayed. 
This article provides a framework for understanding the nature of
the fiscal challenges posed by Social Security and Medicare—a prereq-
uisite for finding specific solutions. The first section of the article
describes the fiscal challenge of Social Security. The second section
describes the same for Medicare. The third section puts the nature of
the Social Security and Medicare challenges in perspective. The fourth
section discusses the growing consequences of waiting to solve these
severe problems. 
I. THE SOCIAL SECURITY CHALLENGE
While Social Security is not an imminent crisis for the nation, it
does represent a significant and inevitable challenge. As the baby-
boom generation begins to retire, Social Security expenditures are
projected to increase much faster than revenues. Indeed, current pro-
jections indicate that the Social Security Trust Fund will run out of
money in 2041. In this event, new revenue sources will be needed to
pay for promised expenditures—or else promised benefits must be
cut to match revenues. This section provides some background on
the history and structure of Social Security and then takes a detailed
look at the looming fiscal challenge.
A brief history of Social Security
In 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced his intention
to Congress to create a social insurance program that would provide
economic security for the aged. Congress drafted and the president
signed the Social Security Act in 1935, creating a social insurance
program that supported individuals 65 and older after retirement.
Social Security is designed to protect against the loss of earnings
due to retirement, death, or disability. Social Security is actually two
separate government programs—Federal Old-Age Survivors Insurance
(OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI). OASI pays monthly benefits to
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retired workers or to the survivors of deceased workers, while DI pays
monthly benefits to disabled workers and their families. Together, the
programs are known as OASDI. 
The Social Security Act has been amended numerous times since
1935 (Table 1). Most of the changes through the early 1970s expanded
the scope of the program. Beginning in 1977, however, many of the
changes were designed to slow the growth of benefits as Social Security
began to face funding shortfalls. 
Social Security benefits and revenues
While Social Security is widely thought of as a program that pays
benefits to retirees, only about two-thirds of beneficiaries are retirees.
The other beneficiaries are disabled workers and family members of
retired, disabled, or deceased workers.
1
In 2004, 47
1⁄2 million beneficiaries received a total of $497.1 billion
in benefits. Retirees receive benefits based on the highest-earning 35
years of their working life. Initial benefits are indexed to wages (which
reflect inflation and productivity).
2 The annual increases in benefits are
indexed to the cost of living.
3 Individuals who retire before their normal
retirement age are subject to the earnings test and receive a reduced
benefit, while those who retire after their normal retirement age receive
an increased benefit.
4
Social Security benefits are funded by two dedicated sources of
revenue. The first and larger source of dedicated revenue comes from
payroll taxes. The tax rate for OASDI is 12.4 percent. Employers and
employees share equally in paying the earnings tax, while self-employed
workers must pay the tax in full.
5 Earnings are taxed up to a maximum
amount ($94,200 in 2006), which increases with average wages.     
The smaller source of dedicated revenue is an income tax on Social
Security benefits paid by beneficiaries. Since the Social Security Amend-
ments in 1983, up to half of benefits have been subject to income tax.
After 1993, the percentage of benefits potentially subject to income
taxes was increased to 85 percent. The revenue from taxing benefits is
split between Social Security and Medicare HI, with Social Security
receiving the larger share of revenue.
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Table 1
CHANGES TO SOCIAL SECURITY
1939 • Add benefits for spouses and minor children of a retired worker
• Add benefits for family survivors of a covered worker in the event 
of premature death
1950 • Increase old-age benefits by 77 percent
• Expand number of covered workers
1954 • Create Disability Insurance (DI) part of Social Security by including 
disability insurance for disabled workers age 50-64 and 
disabled children, beginning in 1956 
1960 • Expand disability insurance to disabled workers of any age and 
dependents of disabled workers
1961 • Lower age at which men were first eligible to receive retirement 
benefits with benefit reductions if taken at an early age (occurred 
for women in 1956)
1972 • Adjust benefits for inflation by introducing cost of living adjustments
•  Index wages when calculating Social Security benefits
1977 • Decouple indexation of initial benefits from indexation of later 
benefits for inflation
• Increase tax rate
• Increase wage base
1983 Changes resulting from Greenspan Commission
•  Raise retirement age (from 65 to 67), starting in 2000
•  Accelerate date of increases in tax rate
• Make some benefits subject to taxation 
•  Include new federal employees in the Social Security system
•  Temporarily increase Trust Fund reserves by borrowing from HI 
Trust Fund
• Delay cost-of-living adjustment by six months
1984 • Change eligibility rules and requirements for disability coverage
1993 • Increase extent to which benefits are subject to taxation
2000 • Eliminate retirement earnings test (which limited benefit disburse-
ments to elderly individuals still working) for individuals who 
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Social Security is generally described as a “pay-as-you-go” system
because the benefits paid to current beneficiaries are financed by taxes
paid by current workers. While the benefits paid to current beneficiaries
depend on their earnings while working, the worker’s taxes are not
saved and reserved to pay benefits for that worker when retired. 
Accounting for Social Security income and spending
The federal government accounts for Social Security revenues and
expenditures with the Social Security Trust Fund.
7 When Social Secu-
rity revenues exceed expenditures, the excess proceeds are used to buy
nonmarketable government securities. The government then credits the
Trust Fund with an increase in assets. In addition, the government pays
interest on these securities, which results in a further increase in Trust
Fund assets.
8
The workings of the Trust Fund can be illustrated using data from
2004 (Table 2). At the end of 2003, the value of assets was $1,530.8
billion, representing the sum of past surpluses. During 2004, dedicated
revenue from payroll taxes and benefits taxes was $568.7 billion. In
addition, the Treasury Department paid interest of $89 billion on the
assets held in the Trust Fund (about 5.8 percent of 2003 assets). There-
fore, Trust Fund accounting shows total income of $657.7 billion.
Social Security also paid benefits of $497.1 billion and administrative
expenses of $4.5 billion, for a total of $501.6 billion. The difference,
$156.1 billion, is invested in nonmarketable Treasury securities, which
are added to last year’s Trust Fund assets. Thus, at the end of 2004, the
value of assets in the Trust Fund was $1,686.8 billion.
Social Security has important implications for the government’s
overall budget. First, no money is actually paid into or benefits paid out
of the Trust Fund. Rather, the Trust Fund entries are the result of
accounting entries made by the U.S. Treasury Department. Workers
actually pay their Social Security payroll taxes, and retirees pay their
benefit taxes to the U.S. Treasury, which are recorded as income in the
government’s budget. The Treasury Department then credits the Trust
Fund account with this amount—$568.7 billion in 2004. Similarly,
benefits paid to Social Security beneficiaries are paid by the U.S. 
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Treasury and recorded as expenditures in the government’s budget. The
Social Security benefits paid by the government are then debited from
the Trust Fund account. 
Second, the interest income credited to the Trust Fund is not a net
source of new revenue to the government—and so plays no role in the
government’s overall budget. The interest entry in the Social Security
accounts is simply an intragovernmental transfer. For example, as noted
earlier, the Trust Fund balance at the end of 2003 was $1.5 trillion. The
interest on this balance was $89 billion, so the government credited the
Social Security Trust Fund with $89 billion and debited the govern-
ment’s budget by the same amount.
9
Third, the Trust Fund acts as the spending authority for Social
Security (CBO, November 4, 2002, page 1). As long as the balance is
positive, the U.S. Treasury has the legal authority to pay Social Security
benefits. If and when the Trust Fund balance is zero, the Trust Fund
becomes “insolvent.” The Treasury can continue to pay benefits, but the
benefits cannot be larger than the revenues flowing into the Treasury
Table 2
SOCIAL SECURITY INCOME AND EXPENDITURES IN
CALENDAR YEAR 2004 (billions of dollars)
OASI DI OASDI
Assets at the end of 2003 1,355.3 175.4 1,530.8
Total income 566.3 91.4 657.7
Dedicated revenue 487.4 81.4 568.7
Payroll taxes 472.8 80.3 553.0
Taxation of benefits 14.6 1.1 15.7
Interest 79.0 10.0 89.0
Total expenditures 421.0 80.6 501.6
Benefit payments
1 418.6 78.4 497.1
Administrative expenses 2.4 2.2 4.5
Net increase in assets 145.3 10.8 156.1
Assets at the end of 2004 1,500.6 186.2 1,686.8
Source: Table II.B1, 2005 Social Security Trustees Report
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and credited to the Trust Fund accounts. In particular, it should be
noted that insolvency does not mean benefits will not be paid. Rather,
it simply means that benefits cannot exceed dedicated revenues.
Fourth, Social Security finances affect the government’s overall
budget deficit because Social Security taxes are paid to the U.S. Treasury
and benefits are paid by the U.S. Treasury. Currently, Social Security tax
revenues are $67.1 billion greater than Social Security expenditures.
This difference represents real resources withdrawn from the public by
taxation over and above the real resources given back to the public in
the form of benefits. According to the books of the U.S. government,
Social Security is providing $67.1 billion of net revenue. The govern-
ment’s overall budget deficit in calendar year 2004 was $401 billion.
Were it not for Social Security, the government’s budget deficit would
have been $468 billion.
10
An overview of Social Security’s long-term outlook 
Over the next decade or so, Social Security will be in sound fiscal
shape, as dedicated revenues will more than pay for promised expendi-
tures, even as expenditures rise. Moreover, since dedicated Social
Security revenues paid to the Treasury Department are currently greater
than expenditures paid by the Treasury Department for benefits, the
difference helps reduce the federal budget deficit. 
Beginning in 2017, though, the situation changes—when projected
expenditures exceed dedicated revenues. The Treasury Department will
continue to debit the Trust Fund for the expenditures it pays and credit
the Trust Fund with dedicated revenue and interest credits. The Trust
Fund balance will continue to be positive for a time, and Treasury will
continue to pay for benefits. But when Social Security’s dedicated rev-
enues fall below promised benefits, the government must draw on other
revenue sources to help pay for the benefits. In other words, with no
changes in other government spending or revenue, the government’s
total budget deficit will grow.
Over time, the deficit between dedicated revenue and expenditures
is projected to keep mounting. The government will continue to pay
promised benefits as long as the balance of the Trust Fund stays posi-
tive. Eventually, when expenditures exceed dedicated revenues plus
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interest, the Treasury must begin to redeem assets from the Trust Fund.
The assets in the Trust Fund are simply IOUs, signed by the federal
government. To pay the IOUs the government must look elsewhere for
real resources. Thus, the federal budget deficit will continue to deepen.
The Trustees of Social Security project that the Trust Fund’s assets
will be depleted in 2041. Thus, under existing law, the government will
have no choice:  It must reduce expenditures by enough to insure that
expenditures equal dedicated revenues.
11
A more detailed discussion of the long-term outlook
Until now, the discussion has viewed the long-term outlook of
Social Security in general terms. This section examines the problems
in detail.
The discussion relies on long-term projections using the intermedi-
ate economic, demographic, and financial projections of the Social
Security Administration and the Board of Trustees for both Social Secu-
rity and Medicare.
12 The Trustees provide detailed forecasts over a
75-year horizon for the economy (growth of real GDP and productiv-
ity), employment (labor force participation rates, hours worked, and
earnings), and population (number of workers and retirees). Clearly,
estimates and forecasts of this nature are subject to substantial uncer-
tainty, especially as the forecast horizon lengthens. In assessing any
long-term implications, it is important to remember this uncertainty.
13
Social Security expenditures are projected to increase as a share of
GDP over the 75-year forecast horizon (Chart 1). In general, total
expenditures are simply the number of people receiving benefits times
the amount of benefits per person. If the number of people receiving
benefits grew at the same rate as the number of people working, then
expenditures as a share of GDP would stay approximately constant.
14
However, with the aging of the baby-boom generation, the number of
people receiving benefits is projected to grow much faster than the
number of workers (Appendix 1 discusses the demographic factors
behind the fiscal challenge.)  As a result, Social Security expenditures are
projected to jump from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2005 to 6.1 percent in
2030 when the last baby boomers turn 65. Expenditures are then pro-
jected to stay relatively steady, edging up to only 6.4 percent by 2080.
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The light blue area in Chart 1 shows dedicated revenues as a share
of GDP over the forecast horizon. Dedicated revenues are projected to
decline slightly from about 5 percent of GDP in 2005 to 4.5 percent in
2080. The projections assume the payroll tax rate remains the same over
the projection period so that revenues as a share of taxable payrolls
remain fairly constant at about 12
1⁄2 percent. However, taxable payrolls
as a share of GDP fall from 38 percent in 2005 to 33 percent in 2080
(Table VI.F5 2005, Social Security Trustees Report).
15
Between now and 2016, Social Security can easily pay benefits
because dedicated revenues are projected to be greater than promised
expenditures. During this time, the difference represents a net source of
revenue to the federal government, which it uses to reduce the overall
budget deficit.
16 In Chart 1, this difference is represented by the black
area and is labeled “SS revenue to the government.”  The surplus is pro-
jected to increase from 2006 to 2008 and then decrease through 2016. 
From an economic point of view, 2017 is a significant date. Begin-
ning in 2017, and continuing throughout the forecast horizon,
promised expenditures are greater than dedicated revenue. As a result,
the government will have to begin drawing on other real resources from
Chart 1
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the public to pay for the Social Security benefits going to beneficiaries.
In other words, Social Security will be running a deficit that must be
financed by the federal government in one of three ways:  reduce other
federal spending, increase other sources of revenue, or borrow more
from the public (by running a larger budget deficit). This shortfall is
represented in Chart 1 by the vertical distance labeled “Government
revenue to SS.”
Beginning in 2017 and continuing through 2040, the Social Secu-
rity Trust Fund will need to augment its dedicated revenues to pay
promised benefits. This will occur in two steps. Between 2017 and
2027, the Trust Fund will use some of the interest income it earns on its
assets (shown by the light gray area in the chart). For example, in 2018,
dedicated revenues are projected to exceed expenditures by $37.6
billion. The Trust Fund will pay this amount by “spending” some of its
interest income. Between 2027 and 2040, dedicated revenue plus all of
the interest credits will be less than promised expenditures. The Social
Security Trust Fund will continue to pay benefits by selling assets, as
shown by the dark gray area in the chart. 
The difference between expenditures and dedicated revenues is pro-
jected to grow over time. In 2018, this deficit is only 0.16 percent of
GDP. However, the deficit is projected to grow to 1.1 percent of GDP
by 2027 and 1.5 percent by 2040.
This situation is clearly not sustainable. According to the Trustees’
projections, the Trust Fund assets will be depleted in 2041. Under
current law, Social Security is not allowed to borrow from the public to
pay for expenditures. Thus, with no changes in the law, only one option
will be available: reduce expenditures to equal available revenue (taxes
on payrolls and benefits). In Chart 1, the solid black line shows expen-
ditures that are consistent with current law, assuming that Trust Fund
assets are depleted in 2041. The line equals promised expenditures
before 2040 and dedicated revenues afterward.
In 2041, promised expenditures are greater than the expenditures
allowable under current law. The amount that promised expenditures
must be reduced can be viewed as an unfunded liability of the Social
Security Trust Fund. It is not an “explicit” liability since current law
specifies that expenditures must decline once the assets in the Trust
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Fund disappear. Rather, it is an implicit unfunded liability because it
represents the value of the promises that will not be met if current law
remains in effect. 
It is important to distinguish between two different unfunded lia-
bilities: the unfunded liability of the Social Security Trust Fund and the
Social Security unfunded liability.
17 As its term suggests, the “unfunded
liability of the Social Security Trust Fund” is the present value of the
difference between promised expenditures and dedicated revenues after
the Social Security Trust Fund assets are depleted. Chart 1 shows this as
the dark blue area. According to the Trustees, the present value of this
unfunded liability is $4 trillion (2005 Social Security Trustees Report,
page 2). In terms of today’s population, this future obligation amounts
to $13,000 per person. 
The second unfunded liability—“the Social Security unfunded
liability”—represents the government’s liability and is the present
value of the difference between promised expenditures and dedicated
revenue over the entire 75 years (2005-80). The Trustees estimate this
present value at $5.7 trillion, or $19,000 per person. In Chart 1, this
amount is shown by the difference between the dedicated revenue
area and the actual expenditure line until 2041 and promised expen-
diture line thereafter. 
The Social Security unfunded liability is greater than the unfunded
liability of the Trust Fund because the interest income and asset sales
from the Trust Fund do not represent net new sources of revenue for
paying Social Security benefits. In fact, Social Security’s unfunded lia-
bility is greater than the Trust Fund’s unfunded liability by an amount
equal to the current value of the Social Security Trust Fund.
II. THE MEDICARE CHALLENGE
Like Social Security, Medicare’s expenses are projected to mount
steadily as the baby-boom generation ages. But Medicare is also threat-
ened by another factor—sharply rising healthcare costs. Medicare’s
Trustees project that spending will rise much faster than Social Security
spending and, more important, will make Social Security’s fiscal chal-
lenge pale by comparison.
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A brief history of Medicare
Medicare came into existence as the main part of the 1965 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act. These amendments contained
provisions for what are now Medicare Part A, Hospital Insurance (HI);
and Medicare Part B, Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI). Origi-
nally, both HI and SMI benefits were provided to anyone 65 or over
who qualified for Social Security benefits. HI beneficiaries received
premium-free coverage, while SMI beneficiaries were required to pay an
additional monthly premium to partly cover the program’s costs. The
1965 amendments provided for HI to be funded by payroll taxes and
SMI to be financed through appropriations from general revenues of
the federal government, as well as from premiums from enrolled indi-
viduals. The federal government originally funded half of the SMI
program, while beneficiary premiums covered the other half.
Throughout its history, Medicare was amended to cover more indi-
viduals, offer new programs and benefits, and revise its financing
arrangements (Table 3). The most significant and most recent change to
Medicare law has been the enactment of the Medicare Prescription
Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. The main provi-
sions of this act give seniors and individuals with disabilities an option
for prescription drug benefits. 
This new prescription drug coverage, Medicare Part D, is part of
Medicare SMI and is voluntary. Starting on January 1, 2006, all indi-
viduals enrolled in the HI or SMI programs became eligible. Voluntary
enrollees pay a monthly premium and an annual deductible for a pre-
scription drug plan, which they choose from a list of providers.
Amounts for the premiums and deductibles vary based on the type of
plan each enrollee chooses. Beneficiaries also pay a portion of the cost of
prescription drugs through copayments and coinsurance. 
HI and SMI benefits and revenues
Hospital Insurance (HI). The main expenditures include benefit
payments and administrative expenses. Expenditures for beneficiaries
under HI coverage are different for each individual, depending on an
individual’s personal medical requirements. HI helps cover inpatient
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care in hospitals, including critical access hospitals and skilled nursing
facilities (not custodial or long-term care). It also helps cover hospice
care and some home healthcare. Premium-free HI coverage is available
to individuals 65 and older, those under 65 with certain disabilities, and
anyone with end-stage renal disease (which requires permanent kidney
failure dialysis or a kidney transplant). To receive premium-free cover-
age, qualified individuals must also have at least ten years of
Medicare-covered employment. 
Medicare HI has three dedicated sources of revenue. The primary
source is payroll taxes levied on covered workers and employers.
18 In
contrast to Social Security, Medicare HI payroll taxes are levied on an
individual’s total earnings, no matter how large (Social Security taxes are
Table 3
CHANGES TO MEDICARE
1972  • Extend HI benefits to disabled individuals under age 65 and those
under age 65 with end-stage renal disease
• Extend SMI benefits to individuals under 65 and eligible for HI 
benefits
• Allow voluntary participation in HI program with additional 
monthly HI premium
• Adjust financing arrangement of SMI so general revenue 
transfers from Treasury would cover expected cost of program in 
excess of total income from individual premiums (even if revenue 
transfer is greater than 50 percent of total cost)
1980 • Extend HI coverage to anyone eligible for Social Security benefits, 
if that person were to apply
1982-83 • Extend HI coverage to federal civilian employees and employees 
for nonprofit organizations
1985 • Assess penalties for enrolling late for Medicare HI benefits for 
voluntary participants paying monthly premiums
1989 • Allow disabled individuals to purchase HI or SMI coverage with 
premiums if they no longer qualify for Social Security disability 
benefits because their earnings exceed a specified amount
1994 • Elimination of HI taxable earnings base, all taxable earnings now 
subject to Medicare HI taxes
2003 • Enact Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Moderniza
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only levied on earnings up to $94,200 in 2006). Employers and
employees share in the cost of the HI payroll tax, contributing 1.45
percent each of the employee’s taxable earnings. Self-employed individ-
uals must pay the full 2.9 percent of total taxable earnings. 
The second source of dedicated income is premium income. Recip-
ients do not pay a monthly premium if they or a spouse paid Medicare
taxes while working. However, individuals not qualified for premium-
free coverage can purchase Medicare HI coverage by paying specified
monthly premiums ($393 per month in 2006).
19 All HI beneficiaries
must pay an initial deductible during hospital stays (in 2006, $952 for
a hospital stay of 1-60 days).
20
The third source of dedicated revenue is income from the taxation
of OASDI benefits. As noted earlier, the revenue is split between Social
Security and Medicare, with the smaller share going to the Medicare HI
Trust Fund. 
In addition to these sources of revenue, the HI Trust Fund also
includes interest credits on the Trust Fund’s assets. Like Social Security,
these interest credits are intragovernmental transfers and do not repre-
sent a net new source of revenue for paying for benefits.
Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI). SMI (Medicare Part B)
helps cover doctors’ services and outpatient care. Also covered are serv-
ices by physical or occupational therapists and some home health care
(HI does not cover these types of services). SMI is available to all HI
enrollees. The new prescription drug program (Medicare Part D) is
available to every person with Medicare coverage. 
The financing arrangement of SMI is quite different from Social
Security and HI. In general, dedicated revenues for SMI are paid by
beneficiaries in the form of monthly premiums, which are set to cover
25 percent of Medicare expenditures.
21 The other 75 percent is
covered by general revenue transfers from the U.S. Treasury. While
this 75 percent contribution is a formal budget obligation, it is not
considered dedicated revenue because the law does not specify specific
revenue sources.
All SMI (Part B) recipients, unlike HI recipients, must pay a
monthly premium ($88.50 per month in 2006) to receive the added
health insurance coverage.
22 Furthermore, they must pay an annual
deductible ($124 in 2006) before Medicare begins to pay its share of
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the costs of these medical services. Beginning in 2006, the annual
deductible for SMI will be indexed to an inflation factor (previously it
was set by statute).
23 These premium and deductible rates will change
on an annual basis. 
For prescription drug coverage (Medicare Part D), recipients will
have to pay a monthly premium (which varies by plan), and a yearly
deductible (no more than $250 in 2006). In addition, beneficiaries will
pay a part of the cost of prescriptions drugs in the form of a copayment
or coinsurance. Costs to the beneficiary will vary depending on the plan
chosen. With a higher monthly premium, recipients can receive a plan
with more coverage and additional drugs. Those with low income or
limited resources may qualify for extra help and may not have to pay a
premium or deductible. 
Accounting for Medicare income and spending
Medicare HI and SMI operate under different financing arrange-
ments. The HI Trust Fund operates similarly to the Social Security trust
fund. When HI revenues exceed expenditures, the government credits
the trust fund with an increase in assets equal to the excess of revenues
over expenditures. As with Social Security, the government also pays
interest credits on the Trust Fund’s assets, further increasing the fund.
The column labeled HI in Table 4 outlines the operations of the HI
Trust Fund in fiscal year 2004. 
In 2004, HI revenues from payroll and benefit taxes, premiums,
transfers, and interest income were $183.9 billion and expenditures
were $170.6 billion. As a result, assets in the Trust Fund increased by
$13.3 billion. The operations of HI have the same effect on the overall
federal government budget as that of Social Security. If dedicated rev-
enues exceed expenditures in any given year, then the program acts as a
source of supplementary income for the government. 
As Table 4 shows, SMI revenues in 2004 were $31.4 billion from
premiums and $100.4 billion from the federal government. Expendi-
tures were $138.3 billion. Since expenditures were slightly larger than
revenues, the Trust Fund redeemed $4.5 billion of assets. Thus, with 75
percent of SMI program expenditures financed by the government,
SMI is always a direct drain on the federal budget.
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The outlook for HI
Medicare HI expenditures are projected to grow rapidly over the
forecast horizon (Chart 2). (Appendix 2 discusses how data for 2015-20
were calculated.)  The same demographic factors causing Social Security
expenditures to rise also affect HI. Unlike Social Security, though, the
cost of Medicare benefits depends on the cost of healthcare rather than
past earnings. With healthcare costs rising much faster than growth in
the economy, Medicare HI faces a significant cost challenge. Over the
past half century, for example, annual healthcare costs have risen more
than two percentage points faster than GDP. The Trustees of Medicare
assume this divergence will gradually decline to one percentage point
annually. Thus, while Social Security expenditures relative to GDP
should eventually become relatively stable, HI expenditures are pro-
jected to climb from 1.5 percent of GDP today to 5.5 percent by 2080.
Meanwhile, HI’s dedicated revenues as a share of GDP are projected to
Table 4
MEDICARE INCOME AND EXPENDITURES IN
CALENDAR YEAR 2004 (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
HI SMI Combined
Assets at the end of 2003 256.0 24.0 280.0
Total income 183.9 133.8 317.7
Dedicated revenue 167.2 31.4 198.7
Payroll taxes 156.7 - 156.7
Taxation of benefits 8.6 - 8.6
Premiums 1.9 31.4 33.4
Interest 15.0 1.5 16.5
General revenue .6 100.4 101.0
Other 1.2 .4 1.6
Total expenditures 170.6 138.3 308.9
Benefit payments 167.6 135.4 302.5
Administrative expenses 3.0 2.9 6.4
Net increase in assets 13.3 -4.5 8.8
Assets at the end of 2004 269.3 19.4 288.8
Source:  Table II.B1,  2005 Medicare Trustees ReportECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2006 23
remain relatively stable at about 1.45 percent (the light blue area in
Chart 2). They remain stable, assuming the payroll tax rate stays at 2.9
percent of taxable payrolls.
HI expenditures exceeded dedicated revenues in 2004 and are pro-
jected to continue doing so throughout the forecast horizon (Chart 2).
In fact, the difference between dedicated revenues and expenditures
increases to 4 percent of GDP by 2080. Indeed, HI’s deficit in 2080
will be double that of Social Security (4 percent versus 1.9 percent).
When HI expenditures exceed dedicated revenue, as they now do,
Trust Fund assets are used in two steps. From 2005 to 2011, interest
income will be needed to pay promised benefits (the light gray area in
Chart 2). Beginning in 2012, the Trust Fund assets will be redeemed
until depleted (the dark gray area in Chart 2). According to projections,
the Medicare HI Trust Fund assets will run out in 2020.
Once the Trust Fund assets are depleted, promised expenditures
will need to decline to equal dedicated revenues, as with Social Security.
In 2021, dedicated revenue from HI taxation will be sufficient to pay
Chart 2
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76 percent of promised benefits. However, since the difference between
revenues and benefits is growing over time, by 2080 dedicated revenue
from taxes will pay only 26 percent of promised benefits.
The amount that promised expenditures must be reduced can be
viewed as the unfunded liability of the Medicare HI Trust Fund (the
dark blue area in Chart 2). This amount can also be viewed as how
much additional revenue (beyond dedicated revenue) would be needed
to pay all of HI’s promised benefits. According to the Trustees, this
amount is $8.6 trillion. Thus, the unfunded liability of the Medicare
HI Trust Fund is more than twice as large as that of the Social Security
Trust Fund ($4 trillion).
As noted earlier, interest earnings on Trust Fund assets and the
revenue from redeeming the assets are simply intragovernment transfers
and not a net source of new revenue to the Treasury. While the Trust
Fund accounting records the interest earnings and asset sales as revenue,
the federal government must finance the interest payments and asset
redemptions with some combination of higher taxes, lower spending on
other government programs, or greater federal borrowing. That is, from
the government’s perspective, all Medicare HI benefits must be paid for
by revenue raised from the public—either from Medicare taxes or from
other government sources.
The present value of the additional federal revenue needed to pay
for HI benefits, over and above dedicated revenue, is $8.8 trillion. This
unfunded liability of Medicare HI corresponds to the present value of
the area between the actual expenditures line until 2020 and the prom-
ised expenditures line thereafter, and the dedicated revenue area in
Chart 2.
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The outlook for SMI
SMI expenditures are projected to increase rapidly over the forecast
horizon (Chart 3). Expenditures will increase for the same reasons as for
HI expenditures—demographic changes plus rising healthcare costs. In
particular, SMI expenditures are projected to rise from 1.2 percent of
GDP in 2005 to 8.3 percent in 2080. 
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Chart 3 shows SMI revenues as a share of GDP. It assumes that
premium income equals 25 percent of expenditures and federal rev-
enues equal the remaining 75 percent. The light blue area represents
dedicated revenue, while the dark blue area represents the government
revenue needed to pay for SMI benefits. Federal revenues required by
law to pay for promised benefits are projected to rise dramatically—
from 0.9 percent of GDP in 2005 to 6.2 percent in 2080. The
Medicare Trustees estimate the present value of this formal budget
requirement to be $21.1 trillion (2005 Medicare Trustees Report, page
174). This is Medicare’s SMI unfunded liability.
27
III. THE COMBINED CHALLENGE
Together, Social Security and Medicare pose a severe challenge. This
section puts the nature of that challenge in perspective.
The key fiscal challenge posed by Social Security and Medicare
arises from the fact that spending on these two programs is growing
faster than GDP—clearly an unsustainable situation. And since most of
the dedicated revenues for both programs come from payroll taxes, the
Chart 3


























Percent of GDP Percent of GDP
Source: Table III.A2, Table III.A4, 2005 Medicare Trustees Report, and authors’ calculations26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
costs are projected to grow faster than dedicated revenues. As a result,
total federal spending on the two programs is projected to soar from 6
percent of GDP in 2005 to 20 percent in 2080 (Chart 4). 
Chart 4 reveals an important difference between Social Security and
Medicare. From 2005 to 2023, Social Security expenditures exceed
Medicare’s. In 2005, Social Security expenditures were about one-and-
a-half times those of Medicare—4.3 percent of GDP versus 2.7 percent.
Beginning in 2024 and continuing throughout the forecast horizon,
Medicare expenditures will be larger than Social Security’s. In fact, in
2080 Medicare’s expenditures are projected to be more than double
Social Security’s—13.8 percent of GDP versus 6.4 percent.
Such large increases in expenditures cannot reasonably be sup-
ported by the federal government without significant changes—either
in these programs or in the spending and taxing priorities in the rest of
the government. If overall federal revenue remains at its 50-year average
of 18 percent of GDP, and if Social Security and Medicare have first
claim to those revenues, then these two programs alone would eventu-
ally absorb more than total government revenue. Right now, these two
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22 Percent of GDP Percent of GDP
Dedicated Revenue for 
Social Security and Medicare Medicare SMI Expenditures
Medicare HI Expenditures
Social Security Expenditures
Source: Tables VI.F4 and VI.F9, 2005 Social Security Trustees Report; Tables III.A2, III.A4,
II.E1, III.B4, 2005 Medicare Trustees ReportECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2006 27
programs absorb about one-third of the total. Under current law, Social
Security and Medicare would absorb about two-thirds of revenue in
2030, when the last baby boomers retire, and they would absorb every-
thing (18 percent of GDP) by 2074. 
The magnitude of the fiscal challenge facing the United States—
finding the revenue to pay for these expenditures—is growing. A
revenue shortfall—the difference between promised expenditures and
dedicated revenue—already exists and is projected to become over-
whelming in the future (Chart 5). The current shortfall is 0.4 percent of
GDP and is projected to climb to 12.2 percent in 2080. The rise will be
particularly sharp between 2010 and 2030—the years when the baby-
boom generation retires. 
Chart 5 also shows another difference between Social Security and
Medicare. Between now and 2017, Social Security actually shows a
revenue surplus (a negative revenue shortfall in the chart). However, the
revenue shortfalls for Medicare HI and SMI already offset the revenue
surplus for Social Security, resulting in the net shortfall of 0.4 percent of
Chart 5
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GDP in 2005. In other words, to pay for Social Security and Medicare
benefits, the government must raise revenue from other sources, reduce
spending on other programs, or increase federal borrowing by running
a larger budget deficit.
Taking a longer-term perspective, the Trustees estimate that the
present value of the total revenue shortfall over the next 75 years is $35.6
trillion. This figure represents the combined unfunded liabilities of
Social Security and Medicare, or the sum of the Social Security
unfunded liability ($5.7 trillion), the Medicare HI unfunded liability
($8.8 trillion), and the Medicare SMI unfunded liability ($21.1 trillion).
As a result, the federal government must raise revenue or cut other gov-
ernment programs by $35.6 trillion (in present value terms) if they are
going to pay for all promised expenditures over the next 75 years.
A 75-year horizon, however, is not sufficient to capture the enor-
mity of the problem. Looking beyond the next 75 years, expenditures
are projected to exceed dedicated revenue by ever greater amounts. For
example, the excess is projected to be 12 percent at the end of the 75-
year horizon. However, even with discounting, the Trustees estimate
that the present value of the combined revenue shortfall over an infinite
horizon is $79 trillion—more than double the $35.6 trillion shortfall
over the next 75 years.
According to the Trustees, to eliminate the $35.6 trillion revenue
shortfall, taxes would have to be raised immediately and permanently by
5.7 percent of GDP. To eliminate a $79 trillion revenue shortfall, taxes
would have to be raised by 8.3 percent of GDP. Historically, government
revenue has averaged about 18 percent of GDP.
IV. THE NEED FOR PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION
With a fiscal challenge so large, there will be a tendency to post-
pone taking action. Nevertheless, postponing action would be a mistake
for several reasons. First, if benefits are going to be cut, or taxes raised,
everyone must have time to adjust their plans for working, saving, and
retirement spending, so that their personal resources plus those from
the government will be sufficient to meet their retirement goals.
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In addition, the problem—which is already large—will only
become larger the longer reforms are delayed, resulting in the need for
more drastic solutions. The problem becomes larger over time because
the divergence between promised benefits and dedicated revenues grows
faster than the overall economy.
For example, the present value of the revenue shortfall for 2005-80
is 5.7 percent of the present value of GDP. However, if nothing is done
until 2021—when the Medicare HI Trust Fund assets are depleted—
the shortfall from 2021 to 2080 grows to 7.5 percent of the present
value of GDP.
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In addition, the present value of the revenue shortfall over “the
next 75 years” also grows larger the longer action is postponed. Con-
sider the following example. The revenue shortfall is projected to
grow over time and is estimated to be 12.17 percent of GDP in 2080.
Suppose that the revenue shortfall remained at 12.17 percent of GDP
in 2081-85. (This is a conservative assumption because the shortfall is
growing over time.) Assume, further, that real GDP grows 1.8 percent
per year—as assumed by the Trustees—and that the nominal discount
rate is 5.7 percent. The present value of the revenue shortfall over the
75-year horizon from 2005 to 2080 is $36.3 trillion, while the
revenue shortfall over the 75-year horizon from 2010 to 2085 is
larger—$38.6 trillion.
30 Thus, the present value of the revenue short-
fall over “the next 75 years” grows over time.
The problem is particularly acute for Social Security and Medicare
HI, which face solvency issues. To eliminate the 75-year unfunded lia-
bility of the Social Security Trust Fund, the Social Security payroll tax
rate would need to increase from 12.40 percent to 14.32 percent. If the
government waits until 2041 to fix Social Security, the tax rate would
have to increase to 16.66 percent and continue increasing to 18.10
percent in 2079.
31 Similarly, to eliminate the unfunded liability of the
Medicare HI Trust Fund, the payroll tax rate would need to increase
from 2.9 percent to 5.99 percent. If the government waits until 2020 to
fix Medicare HI, the year that the Medicare HI trust fund assets are
exhausted, the payroll tax rate would have to increase to 3.79 percent
and continue increasing to 12.33 percent in 2079.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Spending on Social Security and Medicare is projected to grow
much faster than the overall economy in the coming years. While
nominal GDP is projected to grow an average of 4
1⁄2 percent annually
between now and 2080, nominal spending on Social Security and
Medicare combined is projected to grow an average of almost 6 percent
per year. With such different growth rates, total spending on the two
programs is projected to balloon from 6 percent of GDP today to 20
percent in 2080. 
While the Social Security fiscal challenge is large, the Medicare
challenge is even larger. For example, the Social Security revenue short-
fall remains relatively stable as a share of GDP once the baby-boom
generation retires. In contrast, the Medicare revenue shortfall continues
to increase as a share of GDP even after the baby-boom generation
retires. In particular, the Medicare unfunded liability ($29.9 trillion for
HI and SMI) is more than five times the Social Security unfunded lia-
bility ($5.7 trillion). 
The government’s fiscal challenge is to insure the long-run viability
of both programs. Under current law, the dedicated sources of revenue
available to the government are woefully inadequate for financing the
benefits promised to current and future beneficiaries. The present value
of the government’s future obligations over the next 75 years is esti-
mated to be $35.6 trillion. As a result, the government would need to
increase revenues, reduce spending, or increase borrowing by running
larger budget deficits. However, the cumulative value of the larger
budget deficits would need to be $35.6 trillion in present value terms,
which is significantly larger than the nation’s federal debt—the cumula-
tive sum of past budget deficits of $7.4 trillion at the end of fiscal year
2004. Alternatively, changes would need to be made to the structure of
the two programs by reducing future benefits, increasing dedicated rev-
enues, or making even more fundamental changes. In fact, any viable
solution is likely to involve changes in the Social Security and Medicare
programs themselves, along with changes in other government spend-
ing and revenue.
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APPENDIX 1
THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES BEHIND 
THE FISCAL CHALLENGE
This appendix summarizes the evidence on the aging of the popu-
lation and the three reasons behind the aging. 
The U.S. population is getting older and will continue to age into
the first half of this century (Appendix I Chart 1). In 1930, around the
time of Social Security’s passage, 5.5 percent of U.S. population was age
65 and over. Over the next 75 years, that ratio more than doubled to 12
percent in 2005. And according to population estimates provided by
the Social Security Administration, the ratio will almost double again
by 2080 (rising to 23 percent). 
The U.S. population is aging for three major reasons. The first reason
is that Americans are having fewer children. In particular, the total fertil-
ity rate—the average number of children a woman bears in her
lifetime—has declined (Appendix I Chart 2).
33 In 1940, the total fertility
rate in the United States stood at 2.23 children per woman. This number
peaked at 3.68 children per woman in 1957 and steadily declined in the
last half of the 20th century, falling below two in the 1970s. Currently,
however, the total fertility rate for the United States has stabilized at
approximately two. Projections from the Social Security Administration
assume the ultimate total fertility rate is 1.95 children per woman
(reached in 2029). The Social Security Administration cites several
reasons for the decline in fertility rates in the United States, including
changes in social attitudes, economic conditions, and the use of various
birth control methods. For example, they note an increase in the percent-
age of women never to marry, of women who are divorced, and of young
women to enter the labor force. In combination, all these factors have led
to lower fertility rates in the United States and fewer children 
The second reason for the aging of the population is increased
longevity (Appendix I Chart 3). As a result of general health improve-
ments and medical care improvements, people are living longer and
healthier. In 1940, life expectancy at birth was 64 years; in 2005, this
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Source: Table V.A3, 2005 Social Security Trustees Report
age has increased to 77. Moreover, by 2080, the Social Security Admin-
istration projects life expectancy at birth will increase to 83, almost 20
years more than in 1940. 
The third reason for the aging of the population is that the baby-
boom generation is getting older. Children born between 1946 and
1964 will reach retirement age over the next 25 years, and the United
States is on the cusp of a large share of the population entering retire-
ment. In 2006, the first of the baby-boom generation reached age 60,
and these people can expect to live another 10-20 years. 
The aging of the U.S. population means there will be relatively
fewer workers and more retirees (Appendix I Chart 4). The dependency
ratio is the number of working age individuals (ages 20 through 64)
available to support one person age 65 and over. This ratio has been
falling in the past half-century and is projected to continue to fall. In
1950, the ratio of the working age population to the 65 and over popu-
lation was seven. Presently, the ratio is five; and by 2080, the Social
Security Administration estimates that there will only be 2.3 workers
for every person age 65 and over.
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APPENDIX 2
CALCULATION OF DATA FOR MEDICARE CHART
The Medicare Annual Report does not provide as much detailed
information as the Social Security Annual Report. As a result, some of
the data shown in Chart 2 were estimated by the authors using the fol-
lowing procedures.
Table II.E1 (p. 14) of the Medicare Annual Report provides esti-
mates of total income (including interest income), total expenditures,
change in the Trust Fund, and Trust Fund at yearend 2004-14. Accord-
ing to the table, asset sales begin in 2012 (since the change in the Trust
Fund is negative beginning in 2012). As a result, all of the interest
income on the assets is spent on expenditures beginning in 2012.
Table VI.F9 of the Social Security Annual Report (single tables)
reports Medicare HI income excluding interest income for 2005-80.
Therefore, combining the results from Tables II.E1 and VI.F9, interest
income for 2005-14 can be calculated. 
There is a difference between “Total expenditures” reported in
Table II.E1 and “cost” reported in Table VI.F9. For the ten years
between 2005 and 2014, the average difference is $3.74 billion.
According to Table II.B1 of the Medicare Annual Report (p. 4), the
“administrative expenses” for Medicare HI were $3 billion in calendar
year 2004. So, the authors assume that administrative expenses are
$3.74 billion in the calculations.
The authors calculated estimates of interest income and asset sales
for the period 2015-20. These estimates are not needed beyond 2020
because Trust Fund assets are depleted in 2020. Table VI.F9 of the
Social Security Annual Report is used to calculate revenue and expendi-
tures for the period from 2021 to 2080. The following procedure was
used to estimate “interest income” and “asset sales” from 2015 to 2020. 
• The interest rate on Trust Fund assets is assumed to be 
5.8594 percent.
34
• Between 2005 and 2011, some of interest income earned on 
Trust Fund assets is spent on expenditures while the rest is used
to augment the Trust Fund balance.
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• According to Table II.E1, asset sales begin in 2012, which 
suggests that interest income plus dedicated income was no 
longer sufficient to cover all expenditures. Therefore, Tables 
II.E1 and VI.F9 provide estimates of dedicated revenue, inter-
est income spent, asset sales, and expenditures for 2005-14.
• For 2015-20, interest income spent and asset sales are calculated 
sequentially.
º Interest income in year t = 5.86 percent * Trust Fund 
assets in year (t-1).
º Trust Fund asset sales in year t = expenditures in year t 
– dedicated revenue in year t – interest income in year 
t (from previous bullet).
º Trust Fund assets at the end of year t = Trust Fund 
assets at the end of year (t-1) – asset sales in year t.
º Move to the next year, t+1.
As a check on the calculation, the Medicare Annual Report states that
19 percent of expenditures were met by redeeming assets in 2019 (page
15). According to the authors’ calculations, 18.1 percent of expendi-
tures were met by redeeming assets in 2019. While not exact, it seemed
“close enough.”
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ENDNOTES
1In 2004 (the last year for which data are available), Social Security paid
monthly benefits to about 30 million retired workers, 6 million disabled workers,
and 111⁄2  million family members of retired, disabled, or deceased workers
(Tables V.C4 and V.C6 of the Social Security Annual Report). 
2Specifically, a worker’s 35-year earnings history is inflated to current values
using a national average wage index (AWI) calculated by the SSA each year. To
calculate the AWI, Social Security tabulates wage data based on wages subject to
federal income taxes and contributions to deferred compensation plans. Social
Security calculates aggregate wages and then divides by the total number of work-
ers, yielding an average per worker. The worker’s earnings in each year before he
turned 60 are adjusted; they are multiplied by the ratio of the AWI in the year he
turned 60 to the AWI in each earlier year. The “average indexed monthly earn-
ings” (AIME) is then the monthly average of the 35 years of adjusted earnings.
Finally, the AIME amount is used to calculate the Primary Insurance Amount
(PIA), which is the basic Social Security monthly benefit amount. The PIA for-
mula is designed so that lower wage workers receive a larger proportion of their
past earnings than higher wage workers. The PIA formula changes annually, but
for 2006 the formula is:
PIA = [90% of the first $656 of AIME] + [32% of AIME between $656 and
$3,955] + [15% of AIME above $3,955)]
In the formula for 2006, $656 and $3,955 are “bend points” that change
annually based on the formula, which is indexed to average wages. 
3The Social Security Administration calculates the COLA, which is equal to
the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers (CPI-W) from the third quarter of the previous year to the third
quarter of the current year. Each third quarter index number is calculated as an
average of the monthly index numbers in that quarter. 
4The reduction in monthly benefits from early retirement is based on the
number of months that benefits are paid prior to attainment of full retirement
age. In addition, Social Security benefits may be reduced if the recipient earns
more than an exempt amount. Delaying retirement increases one’s benefits in two
ways. First, working longer will typically lead to higher average earnings and
therefore higher benefits. Second, by postponing retirement, a person’s benefits
will be increased by a certain percentage.
5Some federal employees (those in the Civil Service Retirement System hired
before 1983), and some state and local government employees that are covered
under alternative pension plans do not pay into Social Security.
6The Social Security Trust Fund receives the revenue from the 1983 legisla-
tion, while the Medicare HI Trust Fund receives the (smaller) revenue increment
from the 1993 legislation.
7“The Impact of Trust Fund Programs on Federal Budget Surpluses and
Deficits,” CBO, November 4, 2002, is a good source of information.
8 The Congressional Research Service summarizes the Trust Fund as follows:
“While the trust funds have an important role in monitoring the finances of the
program and maintaining its fiscal discipline, they are basically accounting
devices. The federal securities they hold are not assets for the government. When
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an individual buys a government bond, he or she has established a claim against
the government. When the government issues a bond to one of its own accounts,
it hasn’t purchased anything or established a claim against some other entity or
person. It is simply creating a form of IOU from one of its accounts to another.
It certainly establishes legal claims against the government for the Social Security
system (i.e., it is a legal form of indebtedness of the government and does count
as part of the federal debt…), but the system is part of the government. Those
claims are not resources the government has at its disposal to pay for future Social
Security claims. Simply put, the trust funds do not reflect an independent store of
money for the program or the government, and taking Social Security ‘off-
budget’ does not change this.” “Social Security: and the Federal Budget: What
Does Social Security’s Being ‘Off Budget’ Mean?” CRS Report for Congress (98-
422 EPW), by David Stuart Koitz, May 5, 1998.
9As the CBO explains (p. 2), “No public or outside entity pays that interest;
it is a credit from the government’s general fund to the Social Security trust
funds.… All such intragovernmental transfers are required by law, and the
accounting used for those transfers shows them as trust fund ‘receipts,’ despite
their source.”
10An open question, which has important implications for government bor-
rowing, is the effect of Social Security surpluses on spending and taxing in the
rest of the government budget. In particular, did the government spend more on
other programs or raise less in other taxes than they would have otherwise because
Social Security ran a surplus?  If the government did not spend more or tax less
elsewhere in the budget, then the Social Security surplus reduced the federal debt
to the public by an amount roughly equal to the Trust Fund balance. But, if the
government did spend more or tax less elsewhere in the budget, then the Social
Security surplus has reduced the federal debt to the public by a smaller amount,
or perhaps not at all.
11Of course, the existing law could be changed. 
12The Board of Trustees is composed of six members: the Secretary of the
Treasury, Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the
Commissioner of Social Security, and two other public trustees appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, currently John L. Palmer and Thomas R.
Saving. John L. Palmer and Thomas R. Saving were renominated to serve as pub-
lic trustees of the Social Security Board of Trustees on November 7, 2005. Both
are still awaiting confirmation but continue to serve as public trustees until con-
firmed. The Board serves jointly over both the Social Security and Medicare Trust
funds. 
13The actuarial opinion that is included in the Annual Report states that these
forecasts are consistent with “sound principles of actuarial practice” and the
assumptions used are “reasonable, taking into consideration both past experience
and future expectations.” Goss, S.C.; Statement of Actuarial Opinion, Social
Security Trustees Report 2005, p. 217.
14To a first approximation, growth in GDP equals growth in productivity
plus growth in the number of workers and growth in Social Security expenditures
equals growth in number of people receiving benefits plus growth in benefits per
person. Since benefits per person are indexed to wages, they grow at the rate of
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productivity growth. Therefore, if growth in the number of workers equals the
growth in the number of people receiving benefits, spending relative to GDP
should be constant.
15Taxable payrolls decline as a share of GDP largely due to the expansion of
employer-provided health insurance relative to wages.
16The terms “surplus” and “deficit” refer to the difference between dedicated
revenues and expenditures. These surpluses and deficits are not the same as the
“off-budget” surplus and deficit. The off-budget surplus and deficit include inter-
est income as income, which is not included in surplus or deficit.
17This terminology is similar to that used in the Medicare Annual Report (p.
174). They refer to the “Net Results for Trust Fund Perspective,” which corre-
sponds to this article’s “unfunded liability of the trust fund.” They also refer to
the “Net Results For Budget perspective,” which corresponds to the “unfunded
liability.”
18The HI payroll tax applies to all federal workers, including those hired
before 1984 and to some of the state and local workers that are not covered by
Social Security.
19The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) calculate the
monthly premium by projecting total enrollees and total expected benefits dis-
tributed to those age 65 and over in the coming year. The average per capita
monthly cost of the program is the amount of the premium charged to unquali-
fied voluntary enrollees. 
20Other charges for hospital stays may apply, depending on the length of stay.
See www.medicare.gov for detailed information regarding premium, deductible,
coinsurance, and copayment amounts for other Medicare services. 
21See the 2005 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital
Insurance and Federal Supplemental Medical Insurance Trust Funds, page 173. The
split was 50 – 50 from 1966 to 1975. It then began to decline and has been about
25 – 75 since 1984. Table II.C2, 2002 Medicare Trustees Report, p. 73.
22Recipients of Part B will pay higher premiums if they do not enroll when
they are first eligible (premiums increase 10 percent for each 12-month period
from which they were first eligible that they did not sign up). 
23The inflation factor is equal to the percentage increase in the total esti-
mated per capita cost for all Part B enrollees. 
24See “A Message from the Public Trustees” reported in A Summary of the
2005 Annual Reports, Social Security and Medicare Boards of Trustees. They also
note that “during the 1990s … evidence mounted for a persistent 1 to 2 percent
differential due to the increasing use of new technologies.”
25HI revenues as a share of GDP increase to 1.53 percent by 2023 and
remain there until 2038, when they decline slowly to 1.44 percent by 2080.
26It is slightly larger than the $8.6 trillion discussed earlier. The difference
between the two estimates reflects the current value of the Trust Fund assets
($265 billion at the end of 2004). The current value of Trust Fund assets equals
the present value of the gray areas of Chart 2.
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27Since the SMI Trust Fund has unlimited authority to draw on general rev-
enue as needed, there can never be a gap between the program’s promised expen-
ditures and the resources available to meet those expenditures. Therefore, there is
no unfunded liability of the SMI Trust Fund that would be comparable to the
unfunded liabilities of the Social Security and Medicare HI Trust Funds.
28By programs, the infinite horizon fiscal liability is $11.1 trillion for Social
Security, $24.1 trillion for Medicare HI, and $44 trillion for Medicare SMI.
Sources: Table IV.B6, Social Security Annual Report, p. 59; Table III.B10,
Medicare Annual Report, p. 63; Table III.C21, Medicare Annual Report, p. 101;
Table III.C21, Medicare Annual Report, p. 112.
29This calculation assumes a nominal discount rate of 5.7 percent.
30The Trustees estimate that the shortfall for 2005-80 is $35.6 trillion. The
difference reflects slightly different discount rates.
31See p. 16, 2005 Social Security Trustees Report
32See p. 58, 2005 Medicare Trustees Report, and Table VI.F2 in the 2005
Social Security Annual Report.
A similar result holds for benefit cuts. By acting now, an immediate and per-
manent Social Security benefit cut of 13 percent would eliminate the 75-year
unfunded Trust Fund liability (p. 16, Social Security Annual Report). But if the
government waits until 2041 when the Social Security Trust Fund is depleted, a
benefit cut of 26 percent would be needed, with more cuts amounting to 32 per-
cent in 2080 (Social Security Annual Report, p. 16). Medicare HI benefit cuts fol-
low a similar pattern. By acting now, an immediate and permanent benefit cut of
48 percent would be needed (Medicare Annual Report p. 16). But if the govern-
ment waits until 2020 when the Medicare HI Trust Fund is depleted, a benefit
cut of 21 percent would be needed, with more cuts amounting to 75 percent in
2080. The benefit cut is calculated as “balance rate”/“cost rate” in 2020 and
2080.
33The Social Security Administration defines total fertility rate as “the average
number of children that would be born to a woman in her lifetime if she were to
experience the birth rates by age observed in, or assumed for, the selected year,
and if she were to survive the entire childbearing period. A rate of 2.1 would ulti-
mately result in a nearly constant population if net immigration were zero and if
death rates were constant.”
34According to Table II.B1 of the Medicare Annual Report, (p. 4) interest
income in 2004 was $15 billion and Trust Fund assets at the end of 2003 were
$256 billion. Dividing interest income in 2004 by Trust Fund assets at the end of
2003 yields an interest rate of 5.8594 percent. Data for 2005 and beyond were
not used because the interest income reported in Table II.E1 was spent on paying
expenditures, so it did not represent total interest income earned on the assets.
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